The paper explores whether the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) in ethics and political philosophy should be individual or public in character. I defend a modestly public conception of RE, in which public opinion is used specifically as a source of considered judgements about cases. Public opinion is superior to philosophical opinion in delivering judgements that are untainted by principled commitments. A case-based approach also mitigates the methodological problems that commonly confront efforts to integrate philosophy with the investigation of popular attitudes. This conception of RE is situated in relation to alternative accounts, including those of Daniels, Rawls and Wolff and de-Shalit.
academic colleagues? Or is it a practice that should, in some way, be opened up to a wider, nonphilosophically trained, public. 3 The paper outlines some alternative ways of understanding the ambiguous notion of public reflective equilibrium (PRE). I reject a strong conception of PRE on which the philosopher and the public each contribute both principles and judgements and they work in partnership to revise and reconcile these inputs. The paper argues that this approach is too ambitious about the contribution that public opinion can make to the practice of moral and political philosophy. However, I also resist a fully individualist approach, on which the philosopher has no use for wider public views. Rather, it is argued that RE should be public in a modest sense: public responses to philosophical cases represent an important input on the judgements side. Public opinion is superior to philosophical opinion in better answering the demand of RE for judgements about cases that are untainted by principled commitments. Such an approach also mitigates the methodological problems that commonly afflict efforts to integrate philosophy with the investigation of popular attitudes. This conception of RE is situated in relation to alternative accounts put forward by theorists including Daniels, Rawls and Wolff and de-Shalit. The question addressed here is conditional in character: If we think that justification in moral and political philosophy involves seeking coherence among judgements and principles, how, if at all, should we input public opinion? Thus I seek to show what follows for the role of public opinion if we are committed to the method of RE, rather than directly to defend that method against external critics.
The paper proceeds in five main parts. Section 1 addresses some background questions about the nature and purpose of RE and thereby clarifies the scope of my argument. Section 2 briefly outlines four existing accounts of RE. I characterize each of these accounts as either individual or public across three distinct dimensions. Section 3 argues that there is value in "going public" 4 in RE, whilst rejecting the strong notion of PRE proposed by Wolff and de-Shalit in Disadvantage. Section 4 defends a specifically case-based understanding of the public component of RE. The arguments of section 4, I suggest, place the burden of proof on those who would restrict RE to the judgements of philosophers. Section 5 addresses the objection that reflective equilibrium demands considered judgements, and that such judgements are more likely to be reached by those with philosophical expertise. I argue that the countervailing case in favour of the greater reliability of philosophers' judgements is insufficiently strong to discharge the burden identified in section 4.
The Aims of Reflective Equilibrium
Before addressing the question of the role of public opinion in RE, it is essential to consider what RE is for; how we should approach RE will turn on what the method aims to do. 5 Although it has applications in many areas of philosophy, I focus here on RE as a method of justification in ethics and political philosophy. 6 But even within these domains, there are several important junctures at which we can differently conceive of the role or aims of RE. First, what is the status of the outputs of RE? Is RE a tool that seeks to track independent moral truths, or is it a constructivist procedure that generates those truths? 7 Or should we bracket the question of objective moral truth altogether for the purposes of engaging in RE? 8 Moreover, we might think that there is a distinctive role for RE in political philosophy, as a device of political constructivism. Understood in this way, the point of RE is 4 I take this phrase from Elgin, Considered Judgment, p. 111. 5 On the dependence of the approach on the aims of RE, see Hahn, Überlegungsgleichgewicht(e), p. 126. 6 The idea of RE is often traced to Goodman, in the context of inductive logic -see his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955). 7 For useful related discussion of the distinction between perfect, imperfect and pure procedures, see Elgin, not to track independent moral truths, but rather to produce an overlapping consensus that has authority by virtue of being such. 9 For the purposes of the paper, I assume that RE aims at independent moral truths (although it may not succeed) 10 and I set aside the notion of RE as a device of political constructivism. In other words, I treat RE as an epistemic, rather than a democratic tool. Although I cannot develop my argument here, I do not believe that RE is plausible as an account of political constructivism. For example, whilst securing legitimate political decisions often depends on obscuring deeper divisions, the searching and iterative nature of RE exposes potential sources of disagreement. 11 Thus the remainder of the paper does not directly address the political module of RE in Rawls' later work.
Rather I offer a defence of a moderately public approach to RE that is independent of the motivating concerns of Political Liberalism.
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Secondly, RE can be thought about both as an account of how we justify our moral and political theories, and as a description of the process by which we discover them. 13 The specifically casebased approach defended here concerns RE as a justificatory device. Thus my argument is compatible with the view that public opinion, in a wider variety of forms, will sometimes be an 9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this formulation of RE as political constructivism and for pressing me to say more about this issue. Understood in this way, the case for going public in RE turns on concerns of political legitimacy, rather than epistemic considerations. I criticize legitimacy-based arguments for an opinionsensitive approach to political philosophy elsewhere - within wide RE. Thus, depending on the stance we take on the wide versus narrow question, the modestly public approach defended here can be seen either as exhaustive of RE, or as an element (perhaps the first stage) within a broader process.
Mapping the Terrain
The 30 Note that, although they characterize their approach as public reflective equilibrium, Wolff and de-Shalit's respondents were not a random sample of the general public. Rather, they selected participants with personal experience of disadvantage and professionals working with disadvantaged groups. This feature of their approach, which I set aside for the purposes of the paper, raises some interesting further possibilities. For example, as an anonymous reviewer has suggested to me, we might draw on the empirical knowledge of experiential experts to identify problematic practical consequences of candidate philosophical principles. addressed to a restricted set of political questions and the other addressing questions of morality more broadly.
As discussed in the previous section, I do not engage directly with the specifically political component of RE in Rawls' later work. Instead the paper addresses the surviving individual module in Rawls' later work, to show that the later Rawls should, in one respect, go more public in RE (independently of the politicization of his theory). Specifically, I build on a suggestion in Rawls' earliest account of RE: that "the considered judgements of competent judges are the most likely repository of the working out of men's sense of right and wrong, a more likely one, for example, than that of any particular individual's alone." 37 Here, Rawls points to the possibility of a specifically case-based approach to public opinion. A version of this early Rawlsian conception of RE will be elaborated and defended in sections 4 and 5.
Neither Fully Individual Nor Fully Public
This section argues that there are good reasons to accord public opinion a role in RE, but there are also significant difficulties involved in going public and therefore limits to the role that popular attitudes can play. First, I suggest that Wolff and de-Shalit's conception of RE is too ambitious about the contribution that public opinion can make to moral and political philosophy. Secondly, I criticize the dominant individualist conception of RE.
A. Strongly Public Reflective Equilibrium is too Ambitious about the Contribution of Public Opinion
Wolff and de-Shalit's description of their method seems to give a fundamental role to public attitudes. However, further work is needed to unpack the deceptively simple idea of PRE and to clarify precisely how public and philosophical views are to be combined on this account. For example, do we first try to integrate the principles of both the public and the philosopher, before weighing them against the combination of their considered judgements? Or should we undertake a process of RE within public opinion, before weighing popular views against the philosopher's own convictions? It is unclear exactly how PRE is supposed to work, with so many inputs in play. Without an answer to these questions, PRE stands for a broad intention to take public opinion more seriously in political philosophy, rather than a concrete method of justification.
As well as being problematically vague, this approach is too ambitious about the contribution that popular attitudes can make to philosophy. First, it demands that the public actually possess relevant principles. But even where the public do hold ideas that bear on philosophical debate, this typically does not involve anything as structured as a moral or political principle. This is evident, for example, in a study that set out to explore public perceptions of citizenship in relation to liberal, cultural pluralist and communitarian models. The researchers report that although people can understand the notion of citizenship when it is put to them, it has less force than expected as an organizing framework for everyday political thought. 38 Similarly, participants in Wolff and de-Shalit's study had many ideas to offer about the nature of disadvantage. However, they often expressed these views in ways that blurred the boundary between resources and capabilities and between capabilities and functionings, suggesting that these key theoretical distinctions held little salience for them. 42 Thus it appears that the public both believe and do not believe that individuals deserve rewards for lucky talents, depending on whether this is framed as an abstract or a concrete question. This kind of abstract/concrete effect within public opinion has been reported in a number of other areas, including attitudes towards immigration and moral responsibility. 43 From the point of view of RE, some inconsistency is not in itself a problem; after all there would be little for the method to do if all our views were already in harmony with each other. However, the messiness of public opinion does present the philosopher with the daunting task of working out which aspects of popular thought to revise or to give up. Wolff and de-Shalit do not offer an account of how we are to weigh and adjudicate between public opinion at different levels. 41 Note that the issue raised here counts against a model (suggested to me by an anonymous reviewer) on which we do input public opinion on the principles side, but we give public principles lesser weight than philosophical principles. This discounting approach does not adequately address the problem that the public simply lack principled views on many moral and political questions. A third difficulty arises on the view that the public also have a central role to play in RE as process.
Later I will challenge the claim that philosophers possess special expertise in the formation of judgements about concrete cases. However, I do not wish to rule out all forms of philosophical expertise. In particular, we should expect philosophers to perform better than the general public when it comes to seeing the relationship between principles and cases. Such an understanding is essential to the process of revising and reconciling the different elements in RE. But to demand this ability of the general public is, to a significant extent, to ask that they become philosophers.
Moreover, there are significant difficulties in conceiving of the intricate process of RE as a process of collective reasoning. How, as a collective matter, are we to determine what we ought to believe in the face of multiply conflicting judgements and principles?
PRE, in the strong sense defended by Wolff and de-Shalit, is both indeterminate and too demanding.
The objection here is not simply that PRE is very challenging, or that its ideal end-state is not attainable. We should expect this of a method for justifying our beliefs about complex moral and political questions. The worry is that, as Wolff and de-Shalit describe it, RE is not a workable method.
It is telling then that their actual research practice departs significantly from the way in which Wolff and de-Shalit characterize their approach. They claim that "we were open to be influenced by the interviewees, we were not assuming particular conceptions and understandings of these concepts [of functionings]; rather we wanted to reach full understanding on both sides -interviewer and interviewee." 44 This description of their approach suggests significant openness to the research encounter and a willingness to rethink their ideas in response to alternative views from participants.
However, in practice, the important theoretical commitments are made before Wolff and de-Shalit engage with public opinion, and they are unwilling to disrupt their framework in significant ways. 
B. Against Individual RE
In light of the difficulties with strong PRE, should we retreat to an individual conception of RE? Why go public in RE at all? The answer to this question will emerge in part through my defence of a specifically case-based approach to public opinion in Section 4. However, it is useful first to identify some key arguments for going public in more general terms. As Wolff and de-Shalit argue, philosophers are a distinctive group. Thus evidence about wider popular attitudes can play an important role in identifying and correcting biases in our perspectives. 47 Comparing our views with those of the wider public allows us to identify those among our commitments that are widely shared. Where we find divergence, this forces us to consider why we hold the beliefs that we do and to reflect on how our views might have been shaped by our particular interests or social positions.
Where we find public agreement, this also gives us results. But what is the purpose of making the comparison? The most obvious answer is that, when we find disagreement this gives us reason to revisit, and possibly reconsider, our own view. But then we will want to try to pinpoint the sources of the disagreement. This will lead us to start to decompose the individual equilibria, to compare the different elements across equilibria to see where and why they diverge. In effect then we are still doing RE in the comparative stage, drawing on others' views as well as our own. In this way, the distinction between individual and public RE starts to break down. Once we admit the usefulness of comparing individual equilibria (for the reasons identified above), then RE itself takes on a public component.
For a Case-based Approach
There is value in going public in RE, but there are also problems with the strongly public approach advocated by Wolff and de-Shalit. Section 4 proposes a way forward, arguing that we ought to retain a narrower role for public opinion: as a source of judgements about cases. The argument proceeds in two parts. First, I suggest that public opinion better fulfils an important requirement of principleindependence. Secondly, I argue that engaging with public opinion in a case-based way mitigates the methodological problems that commonly arise when we seek to integrate philosophical inquiry with 
A. Principle-Independence
The value of public judgements follows from a crucial observation about the requirements of RE: on this method, principles and judgements are meant, in the first instance, to represent independent inputs into the process of justification. We cannot use our case-specific judgements to justify our principles if we have already derived those judgements from the principles. 52 Thus from the perspective of RE, the philosophical naivety of public judgements is an asset. In contrast, it is much more difficult for the philosopher genuinely to separate her case specific judgements from her principled leanings. The claim here is not that the public do, or should, make judgements about philosophical cases without having in mind any reasons for those judgements. It is useful to unpack the problem of principle-bias further, since there are some distinct reasons why philosophers' judgements might be susceptible to (from the perspective of RE) illicit shaping by principles. First, philosophers will simply have greater awareness of how the cases relate to various candidate principles. As noted earlier, this awareness is essential when carrying out RE as process.
However, it becomes problematic when it comes to generating the judgements themselves.
Secondly, philosophers are more likely to be emotionally or professionally invested in particular principles. 59 There is strong evidence that the general principles people endorse are sometimes shaped by the concrete judgements to which they are already committed. This phenomenon has been termed "motivated moral reasoning": a process in which "an individual has an affective stake in perceiving a given act or person as either moral or immoral, and this preference alters reasoning processes in a way that adjusts moral assessments in line with the desired conclusion." 60 For example, individuals will recruit either consequentialist or deontological principles depending on which perspective supports their preferred moral judgements. 61 But philosophers are different from much of the general public in that they are sometimes emotionally invested in abstract theories or principles. Thus there is a danger of a reverse process of "motivated moral judgement" for the professional philosopher, in which her concrete judgements bend to her principled commitments. peers to embrace what seems obvious without questioning it, and they are disposed to submit to scrutiny their intuitive inclination to judge that something is the case." 63 Whilst crucial to the effective conduct of many aspects of philosophy, these tendencies are again likely to militate against the production of principle-unmediated judgements about concrete cases. Each of these factors, particularly if they work in combination, makes it more likely that the philosopher, consciously or unconsciously, will filter her responses to cases through the lens of candidate principles.
Breaking down the problem of principle-bias in this way serves to problematize the category of "professional philosopher," which is typically left rather vague in discussions of philosophical expertise. For example, when it comes to political philosophy is the professional any career philosopher or only those with a specialism in political philosophy? Or, more narrowly, those who are research active within a particular area of debate, such as global justice or human rights? The extent to which the first and second mechanisms (awareness and emotional or professional investment in principles) apply depends on how broadly or narrowly we draw the parameters of this group. This suggests a possible revision to my argument. Perhaps rather than making RE (partly) public, we need only draw on the judgements of some subset of the philosophical community who do not work directly on the issues at stake?
Although this approach is likely to ameliorate the problem of principle-bias somewhat, best practice is to utilize the views of the general public. Christopher Hitchcock draws a useful analogy here with the way in which scientific experiments are conducted: independent coders are used to categorize observations, in order that coding is guaranteed not to be affected by knowledge of the aims of the experiment or by any investment in achieving particular results. 64 The thought here is that the general public are in the best position to occupy the equivalent of the role of independent coders when it comes to philosophical thought experiments.
This section has argued that public opinion better answers the demand of the method of RE for principle-independent judgements about cases. It is important to emphasize the limited nature of the claim being made for public opinion, in two respects. First, the fact that public judgements fulfil the principle-independence requirement does not yet show that they have the necessary epistemic standing for inputs into RE. I address this issue in Section 5, through the lens of the considered judgements condition. Secondly, even setting aside the considered judgements requirement, popular judgements are not sovereign or decisive. As Rawls emphasizes, no element is beyond revision in an ongoing process of RE. 65 Thus the suggestion is that public opinion should take precedence over philosophical opinion when it comes to case-specific judgements; it is not that the philosopher should necessarily revise her theory in order to accommodate all such judgements.
However, if she consistently refuses to accommodate her theory to public judgements, this starts to reveal something more general about the philosopher's approach: on the account presented here, it implies that she is not really serious about the method of RE itself. In other words, thinking about public opinion in the way suggested here can play a valuable role in forcing philosophers to consider how deeply they are committed to their professed mode of justification, with its central role for judgements about concrete cases. Thus the claim that public case-specific judgements enjoy priority by virtue of their relative philosophical naivety points to one of two possible conclusions: either we must sometimes revise our principled positions to accommodate contrary case-specific public judgements; or the method of RE, with its justificatory role for case-specific judgements, is not borne out in philosophical practice. Challenges arise when we endeavour to bring public opinion to bear on ideas and principles from philosophy, whose purchase on everyday thought and discourse is often limited or uncertain. The wider public do hold views that are relevant to many areas of philosophical enquiry. However, they are not participants in those debates; they do not share the same language and, more fundamentally, they do not organize their ideas in the same way. In particular, philosophers often want to draw conceptual distinctions where there are no clear or stable lines in popular thought. For example, we commonly distinguish between the values of justice, humanity and efficiency and between normative and feasibility considerations. However, most people do not divide up their moral and political views like this; at least not in any consistent way. Philosophical debates are also typically conducted in terms much more abstract than those in which people formulate their beliefs.
Thus philosophers who are interested in engaging with public opinion face some difficult issues about how they convey unfamiliar theoretical ideas in a research setting and ensure that participants offer their responses in terms that respect crucial distinctions.
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The case-based method of engaging with public opinion defended here serves to mitigate some of these difficulties, which were illustrated in relation to Wolff and de-Shalit's strongly public model.
First, people generally find it easier to engage with unfamiliar philosophical ideas in the form of concrete cases, rather than abstract principles. For example, there is a growing body of work in experimental philosophy testing public views about various theories of knowledge. Epistemology appears to be just the kind of abstract, difficult and specialized subject with which outsiders would struggle to engage. Yet when experimental philosophers present non-specialist audiences with concrete cases embodying alternative theories of knowledge, respondents seem perfectly able to understand and to form judgements about them. 68 The more general reason for this is that the cases themselves might be unfamiliar, but the process of forming moral judgements about particular cases is a relatively familiar one. In contrast, abstract principles are doubly demanding: they are both unfamiliar in themselves and they demand that people think in a way that is out of the ordinary. We can draw an analogy here with the way in which linguists study popular views about grammar. They do not expect non-linguists to be able to engage with questions about grammatical principles, but they often do take seriously popular judgements about the grammaticality of concrete sentences.
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Secondly, on the modestly public account defended here, the process of RE is still owned and controlled by the individual philosopher; the public do not actually engage in RE, rather they provide material that assists the philosopher in undertaking that process. To that extent, RE remains an intra-personal process. Thus, I share with defenders of individual RE the view that the intricate process of RE is plausible only as an account of individual moral reasoning. Thirdly, the approach to RE defended here gives public opinion a significant role only on one side of RE. We use public judgements in a piecemeal manner as selected inputs into RE, thus we are not committed to working up popular thought into a coherent whole. It was noted in section 3 that popular attitudes sometimes diverge at abstract and concrete levels and this creates challenges for the strongly public conception of RE. If we take public opinion just as an input into one side of the process of RE, the tension between different elements of popular thought can be viewed more positively. The fact that, for example, the public tend to favour desert in concrete cases, whilst rejecting desert as a matter of principle, suggests that they are, at least, responding in a direct way to the cases; their case-specific judgements are not simply determined by prior principled commitments.
However, the problem of disagreement arises in a different form on the conception of RE defended here. Specifically, how do we deal with the fact that the public are likely to disagree in their judgements about particular cases? RE is not normally understood as a method for resolving mitigates the methodological challenges that arise when we seek to engage public opinion on unfamiliar philosophical terrain. These arguments place the burden of proof with those who would restrict RE to the philosopher's own judgements. This section considers, and rejects, an attempt to discharge this burden by appeal to philosophical expertise.
RE is typically understood to be concerned not with all and any judgements about cases, but rather with a subset of appropriately robust or reliable "considered" judgements. I have suggested that a non-philosophically trained public can deal reasonably well with philosophical thought experiments.
But even if that is right, we might think that philosophers are more likely to have considered judgments. After all, philosophers spend a lot more time engaged in the activity of entertaining thought experiments; surely they will have some special expertise? 75 Perhaps then we should retreat from even the modestly public conception of RE defended here: "Although the philosophically innocent may be free of various forms of theoretical bias … that is not enough to confer special authority on innocent judgment, given its characteristic sloppiness."
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In order to address this objection, it is important to remind ourselves that a "considered judgement"
cannot simply be whichever response coheres with our preferred principle: that would eliminate any independent role for case-specific judgements within the process of RE. 77 On Rawls' widely cited account, considered judgements require that: we are able to concentrate on the case at hand, for example we should not be in a highly emotional state; we do not stand personally to lose or gain; we are aware of the relevant facts. In other words, we pick out judgements made under conditions that 75 For an appeal to philosophical expertise, see Thus we can apply some widely shared Rawlsian criteria for considered judgements to public judgements. Indeed given the ability to control the conditions of judgement in a research setting and the opportunity to learn from patterns in opinion data, a public approach has advantages over an individual introspective approach when it comes to the task of picking out considered judgements.
However, a deeper worry about public judgements remains. We might be able to use empirical methods to discriminate among public judgements, but what about the fact that the philosopher will simply have thought more extensively and more carefully about the cases? Surely such reflection will result both in better understanding of the cases, and in a reduction of the influence of prejudice or social stereotypes on philosophers' responses?
Some recent evidence from experimental philosophy bears on the common-sense assumption that greater reflection leads to more reliable judgements. Schwitzgebel and Cushman compare order and framing effects in responses to a range of common thought experiments in ethics across two groups. Half of their participants were explicitly instructed to reflect before making their judgements, to consider potential arguments on both sides and to think about how they might respond to different variants of the scenario, as well as given a forced delay in responding. 81 Surprisingly, this "reflection condition" did not reduce the impact of apparently irrelevant features of framing and case-order on participants' responses. Research into the phenomenon of implicit bias also bears on the claim that,
by thinking harder about the cases, philosophers will thereby reduce the effect of stereotypes or prejudices on their judgements. For example, Poehlman et al. report that the effect of implicit bias on behaviour is not reduced when that behaviour is more deliberate or controllable. 82 In order for our judgements to count as considered, we need to have thought sufficiently to have grasped the case and to have taken it seriously. However, this does not mean that more reflection is better, in the sense that the more we reflect, the more considered are our judgements. Rather than simply insisting that philosophers' judgements are more reflective and therefore must be more considered, we would do better to try to identify some specific respects in which public judgements are more likely to be defective. Here I consider two potential tendencies for public misunderstanding of philosophical cases.
First, I wish to address an objection to relying on the judgements of non-philosophers pressed in a recent paper by Schroer and Schroer. 83 They argue that many such judgements are "muddled": that is, they are misdirected because they are not grounded in a proper understanding of the relevant conceptual landscape. For example, say we are looking for a judgment about moral responsibility.
The non-philosopher may conflate this issue with the related, but distinct, question of justified punishment and thereby offer a judgement that misses the target. In contrast, the trained here is with the relative standing of the judgements of philosophers and non-philosophers. In this respect, Schroer and Schroer misdescribe the situation. They are right to claim that philosophers will typically have a better understanding of the relevant conceptual distinctions. However, they move too quickly from this premise to the conclusion that philosophers can thereby generate judgements fine-grained enough to target these distinctions. For example, take a political philosopher who makes a judgement about morally right action in a particular case. It is not obvious that she will be able to generate a separate and more specific judgement about the just action in this case -despite her understanding the general conceptual distinction between justice and moral rightness. Thus whilst the problem of misdirected judgements deserves serious attention, Schroer and Schroer do not demonstrate a clear asymmetry between the judgements of philosophers and non-philosophers in this regard.
Secondly, there is a potential problem of realism within popular attitudes. Being less familiar with the rules of the game when it comes to entertaining thought experiments, the public may be less willing to accept the parameters of the cases as they are given. In particular, they may be more likely follow-up study, they find that order and framing effects are not reduced among philosopherparticipants reporting specialization in ethics and familiarity or expertise with the problems at hand. 90 Tobia et al. report that the responses of philosophers and non-philosophers do differ, but not in a way that gives greater credence to the philosophers' judgements. Specifically both groups
show an actor-observer bias: their judgements vary according to whether they are described as the actor or the observer in a moral problem. However, the bias works in opposite directions for philosophers and non-philosophers. 91 Schulz and colleagues find that personality (specifically a facet of extraversion) exerts the same influence on judgements about free will and moral responsibility among those with different levels of expertise in this field. 92 There is ongoing debate among experimental philosophers about the robustness and the proper interpretation of the initial findings of variability and instability in the responses of non-specialist audiences to philosophical cases. 93 Moreover, comparative work involving philosophers and nonphilosophers is still in its early stages. However, the emerging results do not look promising for the claim that philosophers have superior expertise in responding to philosophical thought experiments. This is unsurprising in light of some key messages from the wider literature on expertise. Time spent practising an activity has been shown to be insufficient for the development of genuine expertise.
Other factors are essential, in particular clear, timely and repeated feedback on task performance.
As Weinberg et al. argue, such feedback is limited when it comes to the practice of forming judgements about philosophical cases. 94 In conclusion, the countervailing case for regarding philosophers' judgements as more considered is insufficient to outweigh the problem of principlebias: the conclusion that the case-specific judgements of non-philosophers enjoy priority as an input into the process of RE stands.
Conclusion
Walter Lippman, in his famously critical discussion of the contribution of public opinion to politics, draws a distinction between insiders and outsiders, whose "relations to a problem are radically different. Only the insider can make decisions, not because he is inherently a better man but because he is so placed that he can understand and can act. The outsider is necessarily ignorant, usually irrelevant and often meddlesome, because he is trying to navigate the ship from dry land."
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Lippman's contrast between insiders and outsiders is also helpful for thinking about the role of public opinion in moral and political philosophy. Specifically, I have argued that there is a form in which public opinion has value precisely because the public are outsiders to the terms of philosophical debate: public opinion better answers the demand of the method of RE for judgements about cases that are untainted by principled commitments. Thus, once we think carefully about what RE requires, there is a specific kind of ignorance that increases rather than decreases relevance. A case-based approach also serves to mitigate the methodological challenges that commonly confront efforts to integrate philosophical inquiry with the empirical investigation of popular attitudes.
This modestly public conception of RE was contrasted with some alternative approaches; in particular, the more comprehensively public method defended by Wolff and de-Shalit. Whilst they are right to advocate moving beyond an individual approach to RE, their approach, I argued, is overly ambitious about the work that public opinion can do within ethics and political philosophy. 
